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the weak demand by households and 
firms.1 For such a policy to be effective, 
one needs to know the extent to which 
government spending can stimulate 
the economy, especially when the 
economy is in a severe recession.
One of the models frequently 
used by economists who study busi-
ness cycles suggests that the answer 
depends very much on the extent 
to which monetary policy can be 
employed to stabilize the economy. 
“Conventional” monetary policy-
making typically operates by targeting 
a certain level for an overnight interest 
rate. In the United States, for example, 
the Federal Reserve targets the federal 
funds rate. Monetary policy can reduce 
this interest rate in a recession to help 
stimulate private demand. The figure 
on the next page shows the level of the 
effective federal funds rate for more 
than half a century. Grey areas mark 
periods of recession. As can be seen, in 
the last recession, the Federal Reserve 
cut the federal funds rate essentially to 
a level of zero. 
At that point, lowering the federal 
funds rate further is no longer feasible 
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The U.S. economy is emerging 
from the deepest recession since the 
Great Depression. From late 2007 
to the trough in the second quarter 
of 2009, output fell by more than 5 
percent. At its peak, the unemploy-
ment rate had more than doubled 
from pre-recession levels. Many other 
economies witnessed similar declines. 
s the recent recession unfolded, policymakers 
in the U.S. and abroad employed both 
monetary and fiscal stabilization tools to 
help mitigate the downturn. One of the tools 
that can be used by fiscal policymakers is to actively 
purchase more goods and services: the idea being that 
the government’s demand can offset the weak demand by 
households and firms. For such a policy to be effective, 
one needs to know the extent to which government 
spending can stimulate the economy. One of the models 
frequently used by economists who study business 
cycles suggests that the answer depends very much on 
the extent to which monetary policy can be employed 
to stabilize the economy. In this article, Keith Kuester 
reviews the literature on the effectiveness of government 
spending during severe recessions.
1 Fiscal stimulus packages, such as the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, very 
broadly consist of one or both of two categories: 
outright purchases of goods or services by the 
government (government spending henceforth) 
and changes in transfers or taxes. This article is 
concerned with government spending.
As the recession unfolded, policymak-
ers in the U.S. and abroad employed 
both monetary and fiscal stabilization 
tools to help mitigate the downturn. 
One of the tools used by fiscal policy-
makers was to actively purchase more 
goods and services, the idea being that 
the government’s demand can offset 
2 When interest rates are at zero, central banks 
can still try to influence aggregate demand 
using “unconventional” monetary policy tools. 
In exceptional circumstances, such interven-
tions can be warranted. Central banks can, for 
example, engage in purchases of financial assets 
to try to reduce interest rates in certain sectors.  
For example, during the recent recession, the 
Fed purchased mortgage-backed securities 
issued by the federal housing agencies. Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke, in a speech, called 
this “credit easing.” Central banks can also in-
crease the quantity of money and thereby try to 
influence aggregate demand, a strategy known 
as “quantitative easing.” Chairman Bernanke’s 
speech discusses the set of tools available to the 
Federal Reserve beyond conventional interest 
rate policy. The Business Review article by 
Michael Dotsey assesses some of the alternative 
policy tools in greater depth.Business Review  Q3  2011   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
because the nominal interest rate 
cannot fall below zero.2 The zero lower 
bound on nominal interest rates occurs 
because cash yields a zero interest rate. 
Consider, for example, interest rates 
on loans.  Imagine that you borrow a 
dollar today. You can store it as cash. 
If the interest rate is negative, you 
pay back less than you borrowed, and 
you do not need all of the cash you 
received initially in order to repay the 
loan. As a result, you would have made 
money from nothing. At the same 
time, the lender would take a sure loss. 
Therefore, no lender would offer loans 
with a negative interest rate. Similarly, 
interest rates on deposits cannot fall 
below zero either. You would be bet-
ter off keeping your cash rather than 
depositing the money into a savings 
account that pays a negative interest 
rate. For these reasons, nominal inter-
est rates cannot fall below zero.3 
As the figure shows, in December 
2008 the federal funds rate reached 
this level (of very close to zero) for 
the first time in the postwar period. 
The lack of historical evidence with 
overnight interest rates at zero sug-
gests that previous experience may be 
only a limited guide to the effective-
ness of government spending when 
monetary policy is constrained by the 
lower bound on interest rates. In order 
to ascertain the efficacy of govern-
ment spending in the latest recession, 
researchers have therefore relied on 
theoretical arguments.
The literature reviewed in this 
article assumes that only conventional 
monetary policy is used. It argues that 
in a situation in which monetary policy 
is constrained by the lower bound on 
interest rates, government spending 
may be more effective than it usually 
is. This reasoning is based on the class 
of so-called New Keynesian models 
that have become one of the bench-
mark models for economists who study 
business cycle fluctuations. See, for in-
stance, the article by Richard Clarida, 
Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler for an 
introduction to this class of models.4 
THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL
In their simplest form, New 
Keynesian models describe three eco-
nomic relationships. The first relation-
ship says how firms and households 
3 Clearly, the cash would need to be stored and 
could be stolen or destroyed, a fact that the ar-
gument above ignores. People may be willing to 
pay a fee to avoid the risk and the storage cost. 
Interest rates on some accounts could therefore 
fall somewhat below zero to the extent that 
this fee is reflected in the interest rate. What 
matters for the logic that follows is that there is 
a lower bound for interest rates, the existence 
of which places constraints on what monetary 
policy can do to stabilize economic fluctuations. 
Of lesser importance is whether the bound is 
exactly at zero, as assumed in the exposition 
that follows, or slightly below zero. 
4 The article by Michael Woodford and the one 
by Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, 
and Sergio Rebelo present a more technical 
overview of the arguments in this article.
adjust their demand for goods and 
services in response to changes in the 
real rate of interest. The real inter-
est rate is the nominal interest rate 
minus the expected rate of inflation. 
Basically, the higher the real inter-
est rate, the more goods consumers 
can buy in the future by forgoing a 
purchase today. Higher real interest 
rates therefore induce households to 
consume less and save more. Higher 
real interest rates also mean that firms 
must earn a higher rate of return on 
a project in order for the project to be 
cost-effective. A higher real interest 
rate therefore means less investment, 
too. In sum, a higher real interest rate 
means that private demand — the sum 
of consumption by households and of 
investment by firms — is lower.
The second relationship in the 
New Keynesian model concerns the 
link between inflation and how much 
firms produce. This relationship is 
central to the model and has been 
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given the name the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve. This Phillips curve is 
derived from a structural model of 
firms’ price-setting behavior that has 
two key elements. First, firms have 
some pricing power. They can choose 
to sell more of their product by setting 
a lower price, or they can choose to sell 
somewhat less but at a higher price. 
Second, firms adjust their prices in 
response to events that have an impact 
on the economy, but the price adjust-
ment is sluggish. That is, not all firms 
immediately adjust their prices to the 
full extent. These two features of the 
model allow monetary policy to affect 
output in the short run.5
According to the New Keynes-
ian Phillips curve, if firms face lower 
demand for their goods or services, 
they will be inclined to reduce their 
prices to some extent, since they face 
lower costs of production. The costs 
tend to be lower, for example, since 
less demand means less revenue, which 
can allow firms to negotiate lower 
wages with their workers. Also, if firms 
expect future demand to be weaker or 
future inflation to be lower, they will 
be inclined to reduce their current 
prices in order not to get too far out of 
line with their competitors’ prices and 
the price level in general. As a result, 
according to the model, inflation falls 
when aggregate demand (and thus ag-
gregate output) falls. 
The third and final relationship 
in the model describes how monetary 
policy is conducted. To conduct 
monetary policy, central banks 
generally vary a short-term interest rate 
in response to economic conditions. 
Indeed, the literature that this article 
discusses assumes that monetary 
policy is carried out by using only 
the conventional monetary policy 
means of setting the overnight interest 
rate. This process usually involves 
lowering short-term interest rates 
when economic growth is weak or 
when inflation or expected inflation is 
below some desired level. Conversely, 
it involves raising short-term interest 
rates when economic growth is strong 
or when inflationary pressures build 
up. It has been theoretically shown in 
a wide class of economic models that 
low and stable inflation allows the 
economy to employ resources more 
efficiently, which, in turn, is conducive 
to moderate long-term interest rates 
and maximum employment.6  Such 
behavior therefore describes good 
conduct of monetary policy in this 
model environment. 
Another property of well-designed 
monetary policy is that if inflationary 
pressures increase, central banks will 
raise the nominal interest rate by more 
than the amount by which expecta-
tions of inflation increase.7  This 
behavior implies that the real rate rises 
when inflationary pressures increase. 
Such an increase of the real interest 
rate reduces aggregate demand, as 
discussed above. This, in turn, brings 
down inflation through the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve relationship. 
Conversely, typically, the central bank 
reduces nominal rates by enough to 
make sure that the real interest rate 
falls when inflation falls below the 
desired level (or if economic activity 
is depressed). Thus, in general, the 
deeper a recession, the lower the real 
interest rate.
However, remember that nominal 
interest rates cannot fall below zero. 
Regardless of how low inflation may be 
expected to go or how severe a reces-
sion is, the central bank cannot reduce 
the nominal interest rate any further 
than to a level of zero. Importantly, 
once that bound on the interest rate is 
reached, the more depressed economic 
activity is, and thus the lower inflation 
is, according to the model, the higher 
is the real rate of interest. Note that 
this is the opposite of the relationship 
between inflation and the real interest 
rate that applies in “normal times.” 
The reason is that monetary policy is 
constrained when the lower bound on 
the nominal interest rate is reached 
and cannot follow its usual stabiliza-
tion practice. In such a circumstance, 
when the nominal interest rate is 
zero, the real interest rate is just the 
negative of the expected inflation rate. 
Lower inflation expectations then 
mean a higher real rate of interest.
These observations allow us to 
characterize how private demand is 
5 Keith Sill’s Business Review article describes 
this relationship in much more detail. It also 
explores the extent to which the resulting price-
setting relationship can be used to infer the 
degree of inflationary pressure in an economy.
6 The goals of monetary policy are spelled out 
in the Federal Reserve Act, which specifies that 
the Board of Governors and the Federal Open 
Market Committee should seek “to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 
rates.”
7 See, for example, the discussion in the paper 
by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler.
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related to inflation. It turns out that 
demand is negatively related to infla-
tion in normal times but positively 
related if monetary policy is con-
strained by the zero lower bound. The 
explanation for this is as follows: In 
“normal times,” when inflation falls 
below a level that monetary policymak-
ers deem consistent with price stability, 
monetary policy lowers the nominal 
interest rate by enough, so that the real 
interest rate falls. In response to this, 
households save less and demand more 
consumption goods. Firms invest more. 
In “normal times,” therefore, because 
monetary policymakers want to ensure 
stable inflation, private demand tends 
to rise when inflation falls and tends to 
fall when inflation rises. 
If the zero lower bound is binding, 
in contrast, monetary policy cannot 
ensure that this is the case. The rela-
tionship between inflation and private 
demand — according to the model 
— is reversed! In this circumstance, 
lower inflation implies a higher (rather 
than a lower) real interest rate, since 
conventional monetary policy cannot 
react by lowering the nominal interest 
rate. As a result, lower inflation implies 
less aggregate demand for goods and 
services.  
This puts us in a position to dis-
cuss the effect of government spend-
ing in the model and to see why that 
effect can crucially depend on whether 
monetary policy is constrained.
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
RAISES INFLATION IN THE 
NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL
The Phillips curve relationship 
is important for the logic that follows 
because it means that government 
spending in the model is inflationary. 
The reason is as follows. Higher gov-
ernment spending means that the gov-
ernment buys more goods and services 
from firms. Just as with higher private 
demand, the additional demand gener-
ated by the government means that 
firms have to produce more. Workers 
work longer hours, and firms use their 
capacity more intensively. As a result, 
wages and production costs increase, 
and firms raise their prices. Therefore 
inflation increases. This is so regard-
less of whether monetary policy is 
constrained by the zero lower bound 
on interest rates. What differs in the 
two regimes is how the real interest 
rate and private demand react to this 
increase in government spending.
In “normal times,” if inflation 
rises, the central bank increases the 
nominal interest rate such that the 
real interest rate rises. As a result, 
households save more and consume 
less. Firms invest less. In short, private 
demand falls if government spending 
rises. Therefore, economic activity 
rises by less than the amount by which 
government spending has increased: 
Government spending has crowded 
out private demand because of higher 
real interest rates. The model therefore 
suggests that, normally, output rises 
by less than one dollar if government 
spending rises by a dollar. The techni-
cal term for this is that the “govern-
ment spending multiplier” is less than 
one.8 
THE GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
MULTIPLIER AT THE LOWER 
BOUND
Suppose now that a negative 
shock leads to a very strong reduction 
in private demand. Examples for such 
shocks are manifold. For instance, a 
collapse in asset prices could make 
households feel less wealthy, or 
financial turbulence could increase 
credit spreads and risk premiums. 
Or households’ or firms’ confidence 
in future economic prospects may 
be diminished for other reasons. 
As private demand crumbles, and 
inflationary pressures succumb, the 
central bank reduces the nominal 
interest rate to counteract the 
recessionary impulse. 
If the recessionary impulse is 
exceptionally deep, the central bank 
would want to reduce the nominal 
interest rate to less than zero. But 
it cannot do so: The lower bound 
on nominal interest rates becomes 
binding. As a result, unless the central 
bank now resorts to nonconventional 
monetary policy means, which this 
article does not take into account, the 
real rate of interest is higher than what 
the central bank would like to achieve, 
and aggregate demand is lower than 
desired.
Let us look at the effect of 
government spending under such 
circumstances. Higher government 
spending means more demand and 
thus higher inflation. Since the zero 
lower bound is binding, the higher 
inflation rate induced by the increase 
in government spending means that 
the real rate of interest will be lower 
than it would have been without the 
increase in government spending. 
This is so because at the zero lower 
bound, the real rate of interest is just 
the negative of the rate of inflation. 
Note that a lower real interest rate is 
precisely what monetary policy would 
have liked to achieve but could not 
by using only conventional monetary 
policy means.9 The central bank thus 
does not raise the nominal interest 
rate in response to an increase in 
government spending. 
8 For a review regarding the existing empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of government 
spending for “normal times,” see the paper by 
Robert Hall.
9 This, of course, raises the question of why 
central banks would want to confine themselves 
to using only conventional interest rate policy 
in the first place. Footnote 2 presents a brief dis-
cussion of nonconventional policy and provides 
references for further reading. 18   Q3  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
The lower real interest rate 
means that private consumption and 
investment increase. In the model, 
government spending, through the 
lower real interest rate, thus crowds in 
private consumption and investment 
when the zero lower bound is binding. 
In sum, not only does government 
spending rise, but so does private 
demand. Aggregate demand and 
output thus rise by more than the 
amount of government spending. 
This is at the core of why government 
spending multipliers may be bigger 
than one and therefore bigger than 
usual if the zero lower bound is 
binding. 
REFINEMENTS AND CAVEATS
The above analysis has ignored 
the fact that both households and 
firms base their decisions not only on 
the current economic environment 
but also on their expectations about 
the future. The anticipation effects 
of fiscal policy are important in the 
model environment. For example, in 
order to affect private demand today, 
government spending need not occur 
immediately; a credible announce-
ment of future spending can suffice. 
The reason is that a future increase 
in spending increases demand in that 
period and will therefore increase in-
flation in that period. This affects the 
real interest rate in the future and thus 
also the long-term real interest rate 
that households and firms face today. 
This means that government plans for 
future spending can affect saving and 
investment decisions today. Broadly 
speaking, announcing future govern-
ment spending “crowds in” private de-
mand today if the zero lower bound is 
expected to still be binding at the time 
of the higher spending and crowds 
it out otherwise. As Robert Hall, for 
example, emphasizes, these anticipa-
tion effects — at the zero lower bound 
— can lead to a stronger (cumulative) 
response of output for a given dollar 
amount of the increase in government 
spending, suggesting that the credible 
commitment to future government 
spending alone can — via the effect 
on the long-run real interest rate — 
help stabilize current output. However, 
if the zero lower bound is not expected 
to be binding at the time of future 
spending, the long-term real interest 
rate rises, and such an announcement 
crowds out private demand today. This 
would be the case, for example, when 
the increase in government spending is 
persistent. 
The above reasoning helps to 
explain some of the quantitative 
differences in the effectiveness of 
government spending that different 
studies find in a zero lower bound 
environment. Much of it hinges on 
the different timing of the increase in 
government spending. For example, 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 
find multipliers that are much bigger 
than one. In a similar model environ-
ment, the study by John Cogan, Tobias 
Cwik, John Taylor, and Volker Wie-
land reports multipliers of “just above” 
1 percent for the first quarter of spend-
ing. Their estimates of the multipliers 
fall quickly to levels well below one in 
subsequent quarters of fiscal stimulus 
through government spending. 
The difference between these two 
findings can be explained by the dif-
ferences in the assumptions about the 
spending plans. Christiano and his co-
authors assume that the government 
spending program ends once monetary 
policy ceases to be constrained by the 
zero lower bound. In contrast, Cogan 
and his co-authors look at spending 
programs that last well beyond that 
point. As a result, in their simula-
tions, there are many periods in which 
government spending increases the 
real interest rate and thus crowds out 
private demand, both at the time of 
spending and in the initial periods 
in which the zero lower bound is still 
binding.
For similar reasons, Christopher 
Erceg and Jesper Lindé emphasize that 
the size of the government spending 
packages matters for their cost-effec-
tiveness. In the New Keynesian model 
environment, the bigger the govern-
ment spending package, the earlier the 
zero lower bound may cease to bind. 
This means that government spend-
ing thereafter will – again – crowd out 
private demand. As a result, Erceg 
and Lindé stress that the first dollar of 
government spending in a zero lower 
bound situation increases output by 
more than the second dollar and so 
forth.
This suggests that if the New 
Keynesian model is a good guide for 
policy, fiscal stimulus may be most ef-
fective if it is well targeted in the sense 
that it is contingent on the disruption 
in the economy still being present and 
the zero lower bound still being bind-
ing.10 In line with this, several papers 
argue that the deeper the economy is 
into a recession and the longer the re-
cession is anticipated to last, the more 
effective will be fiscal stimulus through 
an increase in government spending.11  
More recently, fiscal consolidation 
has received growing interest. Turning 
10 That the benefit of fiscal stimulus depends on 
how persistent the economic disruption will be 
implies that it may be difficult for policymakers 
to ascertain the appropriate timing and amount 
of fiscal stimulus.
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the above arguments upside down, my 
paper with Giancarlo Corsetti, André 
Meier, and Gernot Mueller argues 
that a credible upfront commitment 
to cut government spending in some 
future period, when the economy has 
already left the zero lower bound, can 
stimulate demand while the zero lower 
bound is still binding. The reason is 
that cuts in government spending re-
duce inflation. If well timed, they can 
thus reduce long-term interest rates. 
Such a commitment provides further 
stimulus to an economy that is still 
caught in the zero lower bound (that 
is, in times of a deep recession), and 
it helps to finance fiscal deficits. My 
co-authors and I stress that the timing 
of such spending reversals matters, 
however. If the consolidation comes 
too soon, we argue, the associated 
deflationary tendencies occur while 
the lower bound on interest rates is 
still binding, putting upward pressure 
on real interest rates and reducing the 
government spending multiplier. 
All this said, the above analy-
sis simplifies matters in a number of 
dimensions. Therefore, some caveats 
seem in order. First, the economic ef-
fects of government spending depend 
on the entire path of government 
spending, not just current spending.  
Second, the implications for tax rates 
have not been fully explored. If future 
declines in government spending do 
not offset all of the increase in gov-
ernment spending in earlier periods, 
tax rates must eventually increase 
to balance the government’s budget. 
Taxes, however, distort the economy. 
Increased taxes on labor income, for 
example, would tend to reduce the 
supply of labor. To the extent that 
these taxes are expected to be higher 
after the zero lower bound ceases to 
bind, future productive capacity will 
be reduced. In addition, inflationary 
pressures increase in the future. Both 
effects induce households to consume 
less initially, which weakens the effec-
tiveness of the initial fiscal stimulus.12 
Third, the arguments are largely based 
on theory and model relationships that 
have been deduced for “normal times.” 
Given that the zero lower bound very 
rarely binds, empirical evidence on 
government spending multipliers in 
such a situation is scarce. This means 
that, in practice, macroeconomists re-
main quite uncertain about the precise 
quantitative effects of temporary in-
12 The paper by Erceg and Lindé shows some 
simulations; the paper by Gauti Eggertsson 
discusses tax policy at the zero lower bound.
creases in government spending when 
monetary policy is constrained by the 
zero lower bound. This is an exciting 
avenue for future research.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has assessed the effect 
of temporary increases in govern-
ment spending on economic activity 
through the lens of a benchmark New 
Keynesian model. Several caveats 
notwithstanding, the literature finds 
that when monetary policy is con-
strained by the zero lower bound on 
interest rates, such fiscal stimulus may 
be more effective than in weaker reces-
sions. The literature also highlights 
that such a policy must be carefully 
designed to have the desired effect: 
Fiscal stimulus is most effective if it is 
contingent on the disruption to the 
economy still being present and the 
zero lower bound still being binding. 
That said, none of the studies claim 
that higher government spending is 
a panacea for tackling the causes of 
why the economy ended up in a deep 
recession in the first place. In addition, 
the precise magnitude of the impact of 
government spending on the economy 
remains uncertain.  B R20   Q3  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
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